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Summary 
The modern concept of authorship evolved in parallel with the legal recognition of the author as the 
subject of certain property rights within the marketplace for books. Such a market was initially 
regulated by a system of printing privileges, which was replaced by copyright laws at the juncture 
of the 18th and 19th centuries. The inclusion of copyright under the umbrella of property and the 
dominating economic discourse marked the naissance of a new figure of the author, namely the 
author as supplier of intellectual labor to the benefit of society at large. In this sense, products of 
authorship became fully-fledged commodities to be exchanged in the global market place. 
The transition between the privilege- and the copyright-systems, and the prevailing economic 
rationale for the protection of works of authorship, leaves on the background a more original 
understanding of authorship as rooted in the human need of reciprocal communication for the sake 
of truth. Modern authorship, as grounded in a narrow utilitarian understanding of authors’ rights, 
detaches itself from both the economic logic of the privilege system and the rational foundation of 
copyright. 
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Law as a culture-shaping factor 
How is authorship affected by the laws that apply to it? In the last decades, a rich body of studies at 
the intersection of law, history and literature has emerged, addressing the relationship between legal 
systems and the birth and development of the figure of the “author” in various national and cultural 
contexts.1 One of the points that have been focused on in these studies is the idea that, as Martha 
Woodmansee has put it, “one of the most powerful vehicles of the modern authorship construct was 
provided by the laws which regulate our writing practices”.2 The most prominent law, in this 
respect, is copyright. 
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From a historical perspective, the laws that regulate writing practices present two main 
systems that succeeded one to another. The first one, dating back to the age of the invention and 
diffusion of the printing press (late 15th Century), is the system of book privileges. The state, or 
other authorities, conferred to publishers the exclusive right to publish and distribute a given book. 
The second one, with its origins in the Enlightenment culture (mid-18th Century), is based on the 
notion that authors—and not publishers—have certain specific rights in their own creations. In the 
English-speaking world, the resulting legal system took the name of the most prominent of those 
rights, namely “right to copy” or, simply, copyright. From the mid-19th Century onwards, the 
copyright system was then incorporated into a broader family of rights that took collectively the 
name of “intellectual property rights”. As the name suggests, those rights are construed as fully-
fledged property rights over “immaterial” objects such as works of the mind.  
 
The intellectual property paradigm 
A common way of relating to books, and more generally to the writings of both classic and modern 
authors, is based on certain more or less explicit assumptions. The first is that books themselves are 
fundamentally a particular category of “product”. They differ from other industrial products insofar 
as they are creative works. The second assumption is that the only real and legitimate individual 
responsible for the realization of a creative work is the author. The third assumption follows from 
the second, by arguing that the author is also the only real and legitimate proprietor of the work 
which he has created. Finally, as the owner of the work that he or she has created, the author should 
have the right to make free use of his property. This implies the right to dispose of it in all possible 
forms, including transferring its property in whole or in part. 
 Taken together, these assumptions define an ideal space, which can be termed the 
“intellectual property paradigm”.3 Within this paradigm, the author, as the legitimate and sole 
proprietor of the work he or she has created, can make what use of it he or she thinks best. The 
author is free to transfer, in whole or in part, his or her ownership of the work. Accordingly, the 
creative work becomes an exchangeable good. It becomes, in the full economic sense of the word, a 
“commodity”. The relationship between the writer and society thus takes the particular form of an 
“exchange”. It is an exchange in which the commodity exchanged is not just a product, but the 
creative product of an author who freely sells his own property.4 
 It is not by chance that, from the 1850s onwards, when the key elements of the intellectual 
property paradigm began to crystallize in the legislation of Western countries, the traditional legal 
doctrine progressively moved towards the concepts and language of economics. As Sherman and 
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Bently observe in their landmark study on the making of intellectual property in the British world, 
“While pre-modern law utilised the language, concepts and questions of classical jurisprudence, 
modern intellectual property law employed the resources of political economy and utilitarianism”.5 
This shift from classical legal reasoning to utilitarian arguments is more than just an exterior change 
of language; it is, rather, the symptom of an in-depth transformation of the very notion of 
authorship. 
 
Products of authorship as fictitious commodities 
From the point of view of economic theory, the laws protecting intellectual property are justified by 
the particular nature of the “goods” they apply to, namely the so-called products of human 
ingenuity: artistic, scientific or even technical ideas. The economists of the first half of the 1800s 
defined these goods “immaterial products”. The term was probably first introduced by Jean-Baptiste 
Say in his Treaty of political economy of 1803,6 and became immediately popular in the economic 
discourse. The peculiarity of these kind of products, in the words of the Italian economist 
Melchiorre Gioia, is that: 
The room supplied by the landowner and the materials supplied by the capitalist are always 
restricted within certain boundaries; on the contrary, the idea of the scholar crosses the 
borders of the farms, spreads freely upon all the executors, goes about from town to town, 
relieves toil and enriches labors from one end of the globe to the other7. 
The key point with these peculiar products was clearly expressed by Léon Walras in a 
landmark article of 1859.8 In Walras’ terms, while immaterial products can certainly be considered 
useful goods in the same way as any other product of industry or manual labor, they lack an 
essential condition which makes a useful good capable of being an object of exchange, namely: they 
cannot be made available in a limited quantity. In economic terms, the limited availability of useful 
goods is also known as “scarcity”. There can only be a demand for the purchase of relatively scarce 
useful goods, as no one would ask to purchase items that are either useless or freely available to 
everyone, such as air or sunshine. As a result, only scarce useful goods can be privately owned. The 
characteristic of immaterial goods, however, is that they are never economically scarce. Once they 
are made available to the public, they are free to everyone to share without losing any of their utility 
value. No law of the market can convert an idea, or a poem, or a piece of music into a scarce 
commodity. Anyone who wishes to benefit from them can freely do so, unless a superior authority 
intervenes to make them artificially scarce, “making a naturally free item into an artificial 
monopoly”.9 Intellectual property law transforms immaterial products into exchangeable items, 
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which can pass from hand to hand not freely and without limit, but on the basis of an economic 
exchange relationship. In other words, it is a specific act of authority that adds a “value in 
exchange” to the “utility value” that these goods may have. It is an institutional act of artificial 
creation of scarcity. 
  As an effect of this artificial creation of scarcity, works of ingenuity, although they are not 
naturally commodities, they can nonetheless be treated as if they were commodities. This “as if”, 
this “fiction”10 must be guaranteed by an authority which remains above the individual actors of the 
economic exchange. No natural law of the market (no “invisible hand”) is capable of producing this 
fiction by itself. The fiction must be established and maintained as such. From the economic 
viewpoint, the intellectual property-system is therefore a way of establishing and maintaining the 
exchangeability of ideas, and thus a way of giving life to the fiction according to which these are 
fully-fledged commodities like any other goods. 
Acknowledging that such a fiction is to some degree necessary, a question arises: is what I 
have called the intellectual property paradigm the only possible way of establishing it? Or rather are 
there (there have been) any alternative systems that performed the same function in a different way? 
 
Before intellectual property: the book-privilege system 
Before the intellectual property paradigm took shape in the legal systems of Western countries, the 
exchangeability of intellectual creations was secured by a system of privileges. 
Book-privileges are usually described in classical copyright treaties as “primitive” legal 
instruments that were certainly inadequate to give full and effective protection to the authors. The 
word privilegium itself means a lex made for a privus, i.e. for a specific individual: it denotes a 
favor, a concession, the recognition of an exceptional, nearly extra-legal status. In fact, a privilege is 
not just outside the law; it is an explicit exception to the law in favor of an individual or category of 
individuals. Not surprisingly, seen through the lenses of 19th-Century natural law theories, 
privileges appear as ineffective tools to protect the universal interests of authors. So, the Italian 
writer Cesare Cantù, complaining in 1839 of the absence of a copyright law in Italy, he wrote “we 
don’t want privileges, we don’t want any distinction, we are just looking for equality and respect of 
rights”.11 
However, legal historians must be cautious about interpreting the past through principles and 
notions that took shape only at a later stage. It is thus important to understand the ratio of the 
privilege system in itself, setting aside all comparison with subsequent systems. 
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 Book-privilege is, in some respects, similar to patents for new inventions. As a matter of 
fact, the clear-cut distinction between “invention” and “creation” in the sphere of human ingenuity 
only dates back to the second half of the 18th century; up to that time, the sphere of invention had 
been wide enough to include what we nowadays call “aesthetic creations”.12 It was only in the mid-
19th century that the language of “creation” and “creativity” began to occur in the juridical lexis, 
and accordingly intellectual property split into the “copyright paradigm” on one side and the “patent 
paradigm” on the other.13 Thus, it is no wondering that book-privilege, from a legal point of view, 
had the same nature as a privilege granted, for instance, to exploit mineral resources or to the 
invention of a new loom.  
 
The commercial rationale for privileges 
The reasons for granting a book-privilege were basically the same as for all other privileges: the 
need to protect a commercial interest. As a matter of fact, economic arguments were frequently, if 
not always, put forward by the publishers to support their requests for privileges,14 and often the 
text of the privileges themselves explicitly made reference to commercial matters such as the “high 
costs of production” of that particular book. These included not only the costs of printing, but also 
the “cost of acquiring the manuscript” from the author.15 
 A significant economic investment was commonly required as the reason for granting a 
privilege; but because few books had this characteristic, privileges applied only to a small portion of 
library production. Of all the books published in Paris in the first quarter of the 16th century, only 
about 5% were privileged.16 A similar rate can be found in Venice during the same period,17 while 
in the middle of the 18th century privileged books amounted to 20% of the total.18 The use of 
privileges increased but it always applied to a minority of publications, precisely those with a 
striking commercial character. What kind of books were they? According to Mark Rose, in 
England, at least until the end of the 16th century, privileges regarded “almost exclusively classes of 
books such as law books, catechisms, Bibles, ABCs and almanacs”,19 namely books which 
represented a considerable investment for the printers and which were at risk of pirate editions. 
 
Privileges and the public interest 
The privilege system was thus designed to protect a commercial interest of a publisher. This does 
not mean, however, that the system could not address issues of general interest as well. There are 
6 
 
two ways in which the authority could balance private and public interests: by determining the 
duration of the privilege and the conditions upon which the privilege was granted. 
In deciding the duration of the privilege, the authorities sought to maintain a certain 
proportion between the private and the general interest. In the initial period of the diffusion of 
printing, for instance, a longer privilege was usually granted to books requiring a larger investment 
(such as dictionaries and illustrated books), whereas considerations of the public interest could 
occasionally suggest the granting of shorter privileges. A good example is a privilege of only one 
year that was granted in Venice in 1509 to a booklet containing remedies against pestilence, in 
times when privileges were usually of five or ten years.20 Clearly, the general interest of having 
such a book in public domain prevailed over the legitimate interest of the publisher to recoup the 
costs of production. Sometimes the common interest of the guild was taken into account, and 
privileges were used as instruments for redistributing resources among members of the guild: a 
Venetian rule of 1765 established that “common books” (i.e. books in the public domain) would be 
assigned to “needy printers” as a form of “compensatory monopoly for the losses suffered”.21 This 
same rationale can be found in the guild’s practice of treating as expired the privilege of out-of-print 
books. 
Privileges were usually granted under certain conditions, failing which, the privilege would 
be lost. The commonest condition was that the book had to be sold justo pretio, “at a fair price”. In 
some cases, the privilege itself established the sale price, which was determined by an independent 
estimate taking into account the market conditions.22 
So, although the privilege system was mainly designed to protect commercial interests, it 
also incorporated other functions such as promotion of public welfare, wealth redistribution and 
market regulation. As a matter of fact, justo pretio-clauses and limited duration remained for three 
centuries the two pillars of the privilege-system of Venice. In 1780, the Venetian government 
established the perpetuity of privileges in order to cope with the heavy publishing crisis, but the 
following year the Venetian court, in a case called Pezzana e Consorti, declared the government’s 
law illegitimate because “the privilege can give the publisher only the necessary security of the 
capital invested in view of the profit”.23 A similar pattern can be found some years earlier in 
England, where in the landmark case Donaldson v. Beckett (1774) the House of Lords rejected the 
claim of a London publisher for a perpetual common-law copyright.24 
 
Privileges as honours and rewards: the promotion of authorship 
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In the late period of the privilege system, another function emerged considerably, namely 
promotion of authorship. This last function is evidenced by the practice of granting privileges 
directly to the author(s) or editor(s) of works—a practice that dates back from the early years of the 
printing press, but which gained momentum in the 18th Century. It would be too precipitate, 
however, to see in this practice a foreshadowing of author’s right in the current sense. The author 
was not regarded as an individual bearing special rights, but rather as an actor in the book marking 
having specific commercial interests to be safeguarded. Authors were protected by reason of the 
expenses and troubles they had undertaken, and it is no surprise to find, in their requests to 
sovereigns, an emphasis on the investment (in terms of time, money and labor) that the work had 
required. According to John Feather, privileges granted directly to authors in pre-Revolutionary 
England concerned books that “almost without exception […] were learned works that had involved 
their authors in long periods of compilation, and sometimes great expense”.25 In the 1700s, the 
author’s privileges granted in the kingdom of Savoy concerned only highly demanding works such 
as “dictionaries, translations of the Latin and Greek Classics, maps, etc.”.26 This did not exclude the 
possibility that privilege could exceptionally be granted for reasons of prestige or to emphasize the 
particular value of a work. The celebrated papal privilege obtained by Ludovico Ariosto in 1516 for 
the first Ferrara edition of the Orlando furioso is a case in point. As Mark Rose comments, there 
were many other episodes where “the actions of [the authorities] are best understood in terms of 
‘honor’ and ‘reward’ rather than ‘property’”.27 
The “honor”-function of the privilege system can only be understood on the background of 
another peculiarity of the system, namely the plurality of sources of law; that is, that granting and 
observance of privileges could be managed by any acknowledged power, and not only the State. 
Accordingly, there was a plurality of sources of privileges, which reflected the organization of 
powers in the ancien régime. In France, together with royal patents, there were a series of privileges 
accorded by parliament, by other sovereign courts (such as the Cour des Aides or the Grands Jours) 
and provincial parliaments as well as ecclesiastical hierarchies (religious orders, bishops), 
academies and guilds.28 In Venice, throughout the 16th century, privileges were granted equally by 
the Senato and by the Consiglio.29 The situation in Germany was even more multifaceted, and 
privileges were granted by a number of authorities, ranging from the Emperor to the 
Reichsregiment, as well as princes, dukes, and the Senates of different cities30. To all these 
privileges, which had validity over a more or less wide territory, are to be added papal privileges, 
which incorporated an implicit moral dissuasion or even the explicit threat of excommunication of 
transgressors. Papal privileges, and in a different sense imperial ones, can be regarded as almost 
supranational juridical acts on the grounds of their universality.31 
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The privilege system and the structure of the book market 
The privilege-system reflects a peculiar structure of the market for books and for creative works in 
general (including maps, charts, engravings). However, only few of these works were protected by 
privilege. Yet the distinction was not just between privileged and unprivileged books: depending on 
the kind of privilege obtained, the book market was also divided into a plurality of “circuits”, more 
or less connected with each other. The distinction between those circuits was both territorial and 
qualitative. From a territorial point of view, there were books whose diffusion was predominantly or 
exclusively in local marketplaces; then there were books which circulated within the boundaries of 
a national language (which did not necessarily coincide with state borders – as was the case of Italy 
and Germany). Finally, there were books destined for a refined and polyglot readership, and whose 
marketplace extended virtually over the whole civilized world. Only for this kind of books was it 
worthwhile to request a papal or imperial privilege, or even a sum of privileges, as, for instance, in 
the case of the Pandette fiorentine, printed by Lorenzo Torrentino in Florence 1553. This leading 
legal digest, which was distributed everywhere in Europe, obtained simultaneously the privilege of 
the duke of Florence, the pope and the kings of Spain, France and England.32 Other books received 
a lower level of protection, if any at all. In the sphere of the “high circuit”, i.e., the international 
book market, the unwritten rules of the book trade contributed to enforce the legal protection for the 
publishers. Febvre and Martin remark, with reference to the international book trade in the 16th and 
17th centuries, that “bookmakers had no interest in competing against each other. In an epoch when 
every large publisher had business with foreign counterparts, the ruin of one would risk the ruin of 
many others. Every publisher, every city, had its own ‘assortment’ that commercial correctness and 
the interest of all those who were involved, would usually prevent to imitate”33. 
Besides the territorial scope, there were also qualitative differences, or rather a plurality of 
circuits corresponding to books of different genres and purposes. Thus, for religious books it was 
certainly useful to obtain an ecclesiastical privilege. This could have been granted not just by the 
papacy but also by the bishop or even by a religious order: in Germany, for instance, the Jesuits 
were authorized by the emperor to give special privileges.34 Legal, medical and scientific texts, 
which generally circulated in the universities, could receive privileges directly from the academic 
authorities. 
The market for books published under the privilege system was not global or uniform. 
Instead, it was a bundle of circuits, each operating independently of the other. Each circuit had its 
own rules and purposes. There was no common denominator. Privilege was a system for securing 
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the exchange value of books based on the kind of market in which this book was traded. The 
privilege-system was flexible enough to be modulated each time to precisely fulfil its intended 
scope. No need to extend indefinitely the value in exchange. No need to create scarcity where it was 
not necessary. As a consequence, the book’s exchange value, which the privilege created with a free 
institutional act, remained determined and defined not only within tempo-spatial limits, but also 
within specific boundaries. The book ought to become a commodity to the precise extent that it 
served the needs of a buying-selling exchange. Precise boundaries to commodification were settled. 
Where there was no commercial interest, or where commercial interest was already met, no 
exchange value needed to be ascribed to the book. A book outside a buying-selling relationship, and 
thus outside a commercial circuit, no longer needed to be conceived and managed as a commodity. 
It was free to become a common-pool resource for a community. 
It is not by accident that the privilege system entered a crisis when it lost its capacity to 
adapt to the many shades of the book market. In 1780 the Venetian government established the 
perpetuity of privileges in an attempt to deal with the profound crisis of its publishing industry.35 In 
economic terms, the books’ value in exchange, and hence its status as commodity, was extended 
infinitely, beyond the natural product cycle of books. In this loss of boundaries, the privilege system 
soon collapsed and a new juridical order took its place. It was the advent of the intellectual property 
paradigm, as imbued by the concepts of economic theory. 
 
From privilege to right: the philosophical foundation of author’s rights in Immanuel Kant 
Between the privilege and the intellectual property paradigms, there is another discourse that 
emerged in between. It is a right-based (instead of value-based) approach, which bases its 
foundations in classical philosophy. The clearest expression of this approach can be found in the 
work of Immanuel Kant. 
In his Metaphysics of Morals, 1797, Kant famously deduced the illegitimacy of 
counterfeiting books by starting with the question “What is a book?”: 
A book is a writing, which represents a discourse addressed by some one to the public, 
through visible signs of speech. […] He who speaks to the public in his own name is called 
the author (auctor); he who addresses the writing to the public in the name of the author is 
the publisher. […] The publisher, again, speaks, by the aid of the printer as his workman 
(operarius), yet not in his own name, for otherwise he would be himself the author, but in 
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the name of the author; and he is only entitled to do so in virtue of a mandate (mandatum) 
given him to that effect by the author.36 
The book is a speech that a publisher delivers in the name of the author. As such, it 
embodies a set of relationships, each of which has a specific legal basis. Firstly, between the author 
and the public; then, between the author and the publisher and between the publisher and the public; 
finally, there is a relationship between the publisher and the printer. The first of these relationships 
is a speech: the author addresses his or her own words to the public. The second (author-publisher) 
is a contract, and specifically a contract based on a mandate. The third relationship (publisher-
public) is also a speech, but in this case the words are not those of the “speaker”. The publisher 
speaks only “in the name of the author”. His or her action consists in conducting a business on 
behalf of the author, and enjoys all the advantages that he or she legitimately can from this 
negotiation. The final relationship is between the publisher and the printer, and this is a contract of 
work done. 
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that these relationships are not simply placed alongside 
each other at the same level. There is a primary relationship, namely the one between the author and 
the public, which underlies and regulates all the others, giving rise to a series of secondary 
relationships. A specific type of contract corresponds to each one of these secondary relationships 
(fig. 1). 
 
Fig. 1 [awaiting caption, credit, and larger file from author] 
To define those contracts, Kant relies explicitly on the tradition of Roman law. As far as 
labor is concerned, Roman law makes a difference between the contract of work done (locatio 
operarum) and the contract of mandate (mandatum). Likewise, a distinction is made between these 
two kind of contracts on one side and the contract of purchase-and-sale (emptio-venditio) on the 
other.37 Only in the purchase-and-sale contract is the other party obliged to pay a price equivalent 
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(pretium). The contract of work done is perfected by the payment of a wage (merces) that 
corresponds to the work performed (opera). Unlike the price, the wage has no direct relation of 
equivalence with a “thing” exchanged: the object of the contract is in fact one’s own work (opera) 
and not a piece of work as such (opus). By contrast, the contract of mandate does not need to be 
perfected by any act of payment. It is a perfect contract in itself, which is based on the trust (fides) 
of the two counterparts. Such a contract may—but does not have to—be followed by a grateful 
reward in the form of an honorarium. Compared to the other forms of payment discussed above 
(price and wage), the honorarium is not obligatory and, most importantly, does not imply any 
relationship—be it of equivalence or otherwise—with the work provided by the mandatary or the 
task entrusted by the mandator. As explained in Universal-Lexicon of J.-H. Zedler’s (1735): 
Honorarium means acknowledgement or reward, recognition, favor, stipend; it is not in 
proportion to or equivalent to the services performed; it differs from pay or wages, which 
are specifically determined by contracting parties and which express a relationship of 
equivalence between work and payment.38 
What Kant argues in the passage quoted above is that the author is neither a performer of 
work (including intellectual work) nor a seller (of his or her own work). The relationship between 
the author and the publisher is strictly maintained kept between the precise boundaries of a 
mandate, with all the consequences that derive from this contractual figure. The publisher, as 
mandatory, is bound by a twofold duty to fulfil the author’s interests to speak to the public and the 
public’s interest in receiving the author’s speech. For instance, as explained by Kant in the article 
On the Unlawfulness of Counterfeiting Books, “should the publisher distribute the author’s work, 
after his death, mutilated or falsified, or let the necessary number of copies for the demand be 
wanting; the public would thus be entitled to force him to more justness or to augment the 
publication: otherwise the public could provide for this elsewhere.”39 In other words, the publisher 
would contravene the author’s mandate, should he not fulfil the tasks implied by the author-public 
relationship. 
On this background, Kant defines unauthorized reprint as a wrong committed against the 
author and the authorized publisher. The unauthorized publisher speaks, too, in the name of the 
author, but he does so without having a mandate to that effect. He or she speaks to the public either 
in virtue of an intrusion into another’s business, or by presumptuously forcing someone to perform 
an act against his will. As a consequence he commits a twofold wrong: against the legitimate 
publisher, as he deprives him of the profits he could have derived from the execution of the author’s 
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mandate; and against the author himself, since he undertakes a business in his name (namely, 
speaking to the public) without and against his consent. 
 Interestingly, in Kant’s analysis, the wrong of unlawful reprint is neither a tort against 
property (such as stealing a chattel from the legitimate owner) nor a transgression of a state-created 
privilege. As a matter of fact, the Kantian foundation of author’s right is beyond the dichotomy 
between the intellectual property and the privilege paradigm.40 
If, however, the contract between the author and the publisher is subordinate to a more 
fundamental, albeit implicit, deal between the author and the public, what is the ultimate purpose of 
an author-public relationship? In other words: why do authors write books? 
 
Authors’ rights, freedom of the press and the need for truth 
In Kant’s view, the book has, as far as thought is concerned, an analogous function to that of money 
in the commercial world. While money is “the universal means through which men exchange the 
products of their work”,41 the book is the pre-eminent means for people to communicate and 
exchange what they think. The peculiarity of the book is thus the fact that it is the “medium for the 
exercise and circulation of thought”.42 However, the relationship between thoughts and their 
communication is not of the same nature as the one between commodities and their circulation. A 
commodity remains a commodity even when it lies unexploited in a warehouse. Conversely, 
thoughts—unlike what is commonly assumed—cannot be real thoughts in the absence of 
communication. This is the key point of an article that Kant published in 1786 with the title What 
Does It Mean: to Orient Oneself in Thinking?: 
It is often said that a superior power can deprive us of the freedom to speak or to write, but 
not of the freedom to think. But how much and how correctly would we think, if we didn’t 
think, so to say, ‘in common’ with others, to whom we communicate our thoughts and who 
communicate theirs to us? Thus, one can really say that the power that removes people’s 
freedom to communicate their thoughts publicly, also deprives them of their freedom to 
think, that is, the only treasure left us in the midst of social impositions, the only means 
which can still permit us to find remedies for the ills of human condition43.  
A power that limits the freedom of communication also prejudices the possibility of thinking 
as such. It is commonly believed that thinking is a solitary activity, an essentially individual 
performance which can either remain confined to the individual’s mind or be shared with others at 
some stage. However, Kant draws the attention to the fact that thinking is in itself communication in 
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the highest sense. To understand this point it is enough to consider what thinking really means. In 
line with tradition, Kant sees any acts of thinking as essentially acts of judging. Judgment is 
certainly an operation that involves an individual as such. However, precisely in judging, that is in 
connecting a “predicate” (P) with a “subject” (S) in a proposition (S is P), every individual relies on 
something else, namely to that to which the proposition refers. Therefore, precisely in the individual 
act of judgment the individual is immediately de-individualized: he or she is already beyond himself 
and heading towards something other.44 The most immediate form of this “being-by-otherness” is 
being with other human beings. This is why it is so necessary to have one’s own thoughts (i.e. 
judgements) tested by other thinking (i.e. judging) beings. Denying or undervaluing the importance 
of this comparison is for Kant a shifty form of absence of thought, a peculiar kind of selfishness. In 
his Anthropology from the Pragmatic Viewpoint, Kant uses the term “logical egoism” to distinguish 
this from the commoner form of “moral” one: 
The logical egoist considers it unnecessary to test his own judgement by submitting it to  
others, as if he had no need for this touchstone (criterium veritatis externum). But it is so 
certain that we cannot give up this means to assure ourselves of the correctness of our own 
judgement, that this is perhaps the principal reason why learned people fight so hard for the 
freedom of the press. For if we are denied this freedom, we would be deprived from an 
utmost means for proving the correctness of our own judgements and we would be left to 
error.45 
No form of thought, including pure mathematics, can give up this means of testing the 
individual’s own judgement.46 Yet to fully deploy the potential of this means, it is necessary that 
“the best instruments for the circulation of thought”, namely printed books, are left free to circulate. 
The freedom to publish and the freedom of the press are means for guaranteeing a much more 
fundamental freedom, namely the freedom from error. As both the philosophical and religious 
tradition instruct, humankind can only be free in the truth.47 The freedom of the press is not an end 
in itself, but it is a necessary condition of the full and complete liberty of humankind. 
 
From speech to commodity: authorship in the dominant economic discourse 
In Kantian thought, the author is not the “owner” of an asset to be exchanged in the market as an 
“immaterial good”. He or she is rather, and above all, the one responsible for a “speech”, that is to 
say, an act of judgment explicitly offered to other human beings in order to test together its 
correctness and truth.48 In its turn, the public, as addressee of the author’s speech, is not just a body 
of consumers (e.g. “cultural consumers”), but is the space in which judgements can be placed for 
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testing, and is thus the space in which the possibility of “being in the truth” is preserved. Consistent 
with Kant’s position are the following words of Vittorio Alfieri, who writes in his clear-sighted 
treatise Il principe e le lettere [The Prince and Letters], 1789: “Reading, as I intend it, means 
profoundly thinking; thinking means to hold on and hold on, it means to endure”.49 The “public” is 
then an ensemble of readers in the whole sense of the word. Readers are not merely “consumers of 
books” but primarily thinking beings who are willing to endure and share with the author the search 
for the truth. It is only in this willingness to endure that the Kantian “right of the public to deal with 
the author” finds its ultimate justification. 
To what extent are writing practices influenced by the legal systems and institutions that 
protect their activity? Is there a substantial difference in the relationship of author and public in the 
privilege and intellectual property systems? 
  
The transformation of book-privilege into literary property – or, better, the move from one 
paradigm to another – thus has a clear significance: buying and selling becomes the determining 
form for each contract, including the primary and original contract between the author and the 
public. This does not mean, in general, that no other kind of relationship is possible, but these other 
relationships will always be considered as “deviant” or exceptional cases since they are not 
provided for in the paradigm. What happens in the move from the privilege to the intellectual 
property system is a real change of perspective, as a result of which the principle of exchange on the 
basis of sales, which had previously concerned only one – and non-essential – facet of the author-
public relationship, is now not only central to the relationship but its totality. Historically, this 
change began in the 1750s and reached maturity about a century later. 
 In the first half of the 1800s, a crucial period of the rise of the intellectual property 
principles in national and supranational legislation, a wide debate took place in the intellectual 
world. Lawyers, men of letters, simply cultivated people, but above all economists, were 
questioning the foundations of the legal protection of works of the mind and its meaning. Very 
different positions emerged which reflected the diversity of interests, positions, and ideologies.50 
Beneath these differences, however, it is not difficult to see common responses coming together. 
 Among the founding fathers of classical economics, one of the first to concern himself in 
detail with questions of intellectual property was John Stuart Mill. His Principles of Political 
Economy, 1848, states: 
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It is generally admitted that the present Patent Laws need much improvement; but in this 
case, as well as in the closely analogous one of Copyright, it would be a gross immorality in 
the law to set everybody free to use a person’s work without his consent, and without giving 
him an equivalent.51 
Patent laws and copyright are closely analogous cases that belong to the family of 
intellectual property. The important point to note, here, is that no result of human work can be used 
without asking the permission of the person who has produced it, and without paying the latter an 
equivalent. To go against this principle, according to Mill, would be not only unfair but also 
immoral. In the traditional legal conception the payment of an equivalent is precisely that which 
cannot take place in the case of works of the mind. To these belongs a honorarium, i.e., a reward 
that is expressly separate from other kinds of payment (such as the merces or the pretium) on the 
grounds that it cannot enclose any “relationship of equivalence between work and payment”.52 
What Mill implicitly assumes is that the relationship between “everybody” and the “person’s work” 
can be wholly resolved through a buying-selling relationship. 
 This largely implicit assumption in John Stuart Mill becomes explicit in the work of his 
contemporary, the Italian economist Gerolamo Boccardo. From the point of view of the history of 
economic thought, Boccardo is not a giant like Mill. His main work, the Dictionary of Political 
Economy and Commerce, was published in four volumes between 1857 and 1861, and is regarded 
by historians of economic thought as a great explanatory work, a summa in which the various 
themes of the liberal economic culture of the time are brought together. For just this reason, it is 
interesting to read what he writes in the entry “Artistic, industrial and literary property”: 
The author is a workman in science, civilization, progress, to whom society pays a salary, 
just as the factory-owner pays a salary to his employees. […] So-called “literary property” is 
simply a wage for work, the price of a work done, the payment for a duty, in the form of a 
privilege that the civil law grants to the author in recognition of his work and service to the 
social community.53 
What is implicit in Mill’s text is stated clearly here. The relationship between the “social 
community” and the author – a relationship regulated by literary property – is just a particular case 
of an economic relationship between a giver and a supplier of labor. The author is just a particular 
type of “workman”, and society treats the author like a factory-owner treats his employees, by 
paying a salary for the work performed. The different nature of the relationships, which gave rise in 
the traditional concept to quite distinct contractual figures, is here flattened to one level – the “wage 
for work”, the “price of a work done”, “payment for duty”. These latter are at last equivalent 
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formulae which are incapable of any substantial distinction. The author provides a service – and 
society pays a price for it. 
Surprisingly similar words to those of Boccardo appear in the work of a writer of very 
different views, the socialist economist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, author of the treatise What is 
Property? In 1868, he published a pamphlet against the proposed bill to extend the duration of 
literary property in France. He wrote: 
The author is a trader, isn’t he? And with whom does he trade? Neither with you, nor with 
me, nor with someone in particular; but he trades in general, with the public. […] Between 
the author and society there is a tacit agreement, by virtue of which the author will be paid à 
forfait by means of a temporary privilege of sale. If there is a great demand for the work, the 
author will earn a great deal. If the work is refused, he will earn nothing. Let’s allow him an 
agreement that lasts for 30, 40, or 60 years to cover the costs. I say that this contract is 
perfectly regular and fair, and that it satisfies all the needs, safeguards the rights, respects the 
principles, and responds to all objections.54 
Although coming from very different backgrounds—liberalism and socialisms—the two 
economists express almost identical views. The contract on the basis of which society pays the 
author a straightforward fee is a “perfectly regular and fair” contract. Proudhon does not and cannot 
find any objection that could demonstrate the opposite. 
 
Who is the author? 
There is an essential difference between authorship in the privilege- and intellectual property-
systems: while in the first system the author-public relationship can be conceived of as a free liaison 
between thinking beings—a liaison from which some reciprocal obligations originate, such as the 
author’s responsibility as regards to the truth, and the public’s obligation to truthfully read—in the 
second system, this relationship must, in a way, be reduced to an exchange in which the author’s 
credits are settled by requiting an equivalent. In fact, the purchase-and-sale contract is concluded by 
a payment. Can this contract really fulfil all the needs? For the 20th-century American writer Henry 
Miller, the author is not a “workman” in society’s service nor a “trader”. He is rather a “beggar” – 
and not simply in the sense that he’s begging for cash: 
Writers, in a way, are like beggars. They are continually begging for a chance to give of 
their great gifts – which is the most heart-rending begging of all and a disgrace to any 
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civilized community in which it happens. Which is to say, almost the entire civilized 
world.55 
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